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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
Matters of form, however, must not be permitted to divert attention from
the inherent merit of this volume. An Introduction to Criminalistics is a
"must" for every police department library and should be studied by every
officer interested in this branch of law enforcement.
ROLLIN M. PERKINS PROFESSOR OF LAW
SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: SOME REP-
RESENTATIVE OPINIONS. Selected and Edited by Samuel J. Konefsky.
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949, pp. xviii, 325. $4.50.
PROFESSOR Konefsky, who has already established himself as a stu-
dent of keen understanding by his penetrating study of "Chief Justice Stone
and the Supreme Court," 1 is deserving of additional accolades for his superb
job in compiling and editing some of the more representative opinions of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter during his past ten years on the Supreme Court
bench. The task confronting a successful editor of legal opinions is threefold:
first, there is the choice and organization of materials; then, the problem of
achieving a literary and scholarly blending of the different portions of the
opinions quoted, and lastly, the necessity of helping the reader to gain an un-
derstanding of the cases without forcing the editor's viewpoint upon him.
The author has succeeded admirably in all these endeavors. He has arranged
the subject matter in such vital categories as the limits of the judicial process,
government and economic interests, civil liberties, criminal and administrative
justice, and the complexities of our dual system of government. Each opinion
is prefaced by a clear and pithy explanation of the underlying factors of the
case. The brilliance of Mr. Frankfurter's decisions would be excuse enough
for such a work, but far more important is the insight that one gains into
the philosophical differences that have beset the Court during this history-
making decade.
To attempt to categorize Frankfurter's opinions is an impossible task, and
has led this reviewer to conclude that the esteemed justice is neither con-
sistent as to the "means" nor the "ends" by which he arrives at his decision.
There are times when he reasons like a social scientist but draws conclusions
like a legalist, and other occasions when just the reverse is true. The liberal
elements have been particularly antagonized by the learned jurist's sacrificing
of ideals for what they have conceived to be his mistaken idea of the mechanics
involved in declaring a law unconstitutional. The static concept of a Court
that mechanically lays the Constitution beside a statute which is challenged in
1. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICS Sm ONE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1945). See Kent,
Book Review, 2 MIAMI L.Q. 251 (1948).
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order to decide whether the latter squares with the former 2 is no longer in
good standing. Most jurists today readily acknowledge that they too have
social and economic predilections which do and in fact must come into play
in their consideration of any case. It might be worthwhile to examine the
philosophy and beliefs of Justice Frankfurter and place them beside his
opinions in order to decide whether the latter squares with the former.
Justice Frankfurter views the Supreme Court as an oligarchic, non-demo-
cratic organ of our government, and almost reluctantly accepts its right to de-
clare acts of legislative bodies unconstitutional as being far too well estab-
lished to question. It is for this reason that he places such great emphasis
throughout his opinions on what he refers to as self-restraint by the judiciary,
and constantly warns the Court against "the danger of sliding unconsciously
from the narrow confines of the law into the more spacious domain of policy."
Looking back at the past, he feels that the judiciary has been prone to con-
found private notions with constitutional requirements. "Such misconceptions
are not subject to legitimate displacement by the will of the people except at
too slow a pace." He cautions his colleagues that one's own opinion as to the
wisdom of the law must be excluded in the performance of judicial duty.
He concludes that democratic society rests upon the people, and that if a law
is found wanting, it should be removed by the legislature, not by judicial fiat.3
Thus, Justice Frankfurter believes that laws dealing with economic and
social problems are matters of trial and error, and that the Court has dis-
charged its function when it has made certain that such legislation is not de-
structive of our cherished freedoms. One can point to many cases where he
has been guided by this doctrine.4 He has objected to placing the Court in a
position where there was no dependable criterion to guide it.5 In other in-
stances, however, he has seen fit to inject the Court in the role of arbiter even
as to economic questions. This was true when he refused to join the ma-
jority in applying the Sherman Act to insurance companies. 6 Here we have
an example of legalistic exactness. This did not stop him, however, from ap-
plying the National Labor Relations Act to a firm engaged in the business of
insurance. It would indeed appear that "constitutional questions that look alike
often are altogether different, and call for different answers." 7 The same
observation might be made in reference to the fine lines of distinction drawn
2. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
3. These sentiments may be found in American Federation of Labor v. American
Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1942); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Re-
lations Board, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); Osborn v. Olin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) ; West Vir-
ginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 646 (1943) ; and Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 279 (1941).
4. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn,
326 U.S. 230 (1945) ; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S.
177 (1941).
5. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
6. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
7. Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
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by Frankfurter between the 10 East 40th Street s and Kirschban& n cases
involving maintenance employees in buildings having tenants engaged in in-
terstate commerce. The fundamental criticism is not that there might not be
some distinction between the two cases, but rather that the Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter is substituting its judgment on hair-splitting
technicalities for that of an expert agency.
Professor Konefsky has stated that Frankfurter's attachment to the
value of federalism has led him to take the side of the states more frequently
than his colleagues. Konefsky also notes that he has written significant
opinions upholding the commerce powers against the states. An example of
this was the decision in the Greyhound case 10 voiding a gross receipts tax on
busses which operated between certain points within the State of New York
but over routes that traversed the highways of New Jersey and Pennsyl-
vania. Far more extreme than the latter action was the decision of the Court
rendered by Justice Frankfurter in the Freeman case." Here the Court held
that an Indiana Gross Income Tax could not be applied to the gross receipts
on the sales of securities that had taken place in interstate transactions. The
dissent was moved to declare that the receipt of income in Indiana was a local
transaction which constitutionally could be made a taxable event. Justice
Frankfurter distinguished between the denial of police powers affecting in-
terstate commerce not regulated by Congress, which might be vital in safe-
guarding local interests, and the denial of a particular source of income de-
rived from such commerce which would not cripple the state. Such reasoning
strikes the reviewer as an attempt to substitute one's own wisdom as to the
relative importance of different values, and should according to the Frank-
furter formula belong within the realm of legislative discretion.
Contrast this with Mr. Frankfurter's opinion upholding the right of
Minnesota to tax a fleet of airplanes engaged in interstate commerce with
Minnesota as its home port.' 2 The dissenters protested that this exposed air-
lines to the risk of having their earnings taxed by numbers of different states.
To this contention Frankfurter replied that the taxability of any part of the
fleet by any other state than Minnesota, in view of the taxability of the entire
fleet by the state, was not before the Court.'3 In Hill v. Florida,'4 a majority
of the Court held that a 1934 Florida statute requiring labor organizers to ob-
tain a license curtailed the freedom of choice of the employees in the selection
of collective bargaining agents as guaranteed by the National Labor Relations
8. 10 East 40th Street Building v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
9. Kirschbaum Co. v. Wailing, 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
10. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
11. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
12. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
13. It might be noted that there is an urgent need for a reivaluation by the Court of
the relationship between the states and the federal government in matters pertaining to
taxation and interstate commerce.
14, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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Act. An injunction prohibiting unions from functioning in order to enforce
the other parts of the statute providing for annual reports and exacting a one
dollar a.nnual fee was held to be inconsistent with federal protection of col-
lective bargaining. Justice Frankfurter vigorously protested against the en-
tire decision on the grounds that there was no conflict between the state action
and the federal statute, and that the majority opinion deprived the states of
their constitutional powers over local issues. This writer believes that both
majority and minority opinions erred in that the decision, at least insofar as
the selection of organizers are concerned, should have been based upon the
question of whether it interfered with any of the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Liberal persons can agree with Frankfurter's contention that the Court
must beware less it interfere with the right of the legislatures to meet the
economic and social problems of the day. The danger lies in attempting to
place civil liberties in the same category, however. It is in this latter sphere that
so much criticism has centered upon Frankfurter. It must be brought out that
Justice Frankfurter has been responsible for writing such notable opinions as
that in the Bautngartner case, 15 the concurrent opinion in the McCollum
case, 6 and vigorous dissents in the search and seizure cases.' 7 Dr. Konefsky
has observed that one of the greatest contributions of our age has been the in-
clusion of many of our fundamental liberties within the scope of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is in this area that Justice
Frankfurter confuses ordinary legislative discretion dealing with economic
and social matters with those that affect our fundamental freedoms. Certainly
one cannot compare legislation limiting the hours of labor of women and chil-
dren or regulating public utilities, with legislation prohibiting an individual in
his freedom of expression or denying to him adequate counsel in his very
fight for life and freedom.' 8 "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights land of
those freedoms included within the concept of due process] was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied in the court.'' 1 The opinions of Justice Frankfurter
in the flag salute cases,20 in cases dealing with the question of adequate
counsel, 2 ' and the finality of state court findings 22 and in numbers of other
15. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
16. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
17. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Zap. v. United States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946); and Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
18. See Sofen, The Trend Towards the "Denationalization" of Civil Liberties 3
MIAMI L.Q. 397 (April, 1949).
19. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
20. Id. at 646 and Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
21. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ; Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
22. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941)
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
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decisions, confuse the issue by failing to distinguish between these two distinct
types of legislation. That the approach of the Court must differ in accordance
with the legislative problem involved was stated quite adequately by Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson when he declared:
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility, may well
include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of
the restrictions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting.
But freedoms of speech, and of press, and of assembly, and of worship may
not be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restric-
tion only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State
may lawfully protect. 23
The basic fallacy of the. Frankfurter philosophy is the falure to accept
this dual classification. Typical of this approach was his dissent in the Bridges
case.2 4 Mr. Frankfurter opined that the utmost protection to be accorded
freedom of speech and press could not displace the duty of the Court to give
due regard also to the state's power to deal with essentially local situations.
He added rather meaningfully that the literary difference between "clear and
present danger" and "reasonable tendency" is not of constitutional dimension.
Justice Frankfurter warns that reliance for protection of the most precious
interests of civilization must be found outside of courts of law. This is only
half a definition of democracy for while it is true that "the pursuit of liberty is
a great affirmation inspired by the positive energies of the human race" it must
never be forgotten that "the constitutional means to liberty are, in the main,
a series of negatives raised against the powerful." 25
We are told by the author that as a Professor of Administrative Law
Frankfurter had urged the bench to respect the activities of regulatory tribu-
nals, but that he had also been aware that the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion was open to potential abuse. On the whole one can find both these at-
titudes reflected by the opinions of Justice Frankfurter. In the Morgan case,2 6
he declared that the administrative agencies and the courts were to be deemed
collaborative instrumentalities of justice, and that the appropriate independ-
ence of each should be respected by the other. In the Scripps-Howard case,27
he brought out that the courts no less than administrative bodies are agencies
of the government, and held that the power of the court to stay execution was
a power as old as the judicial system of the nation. He has protested against
the use of the so-called "jurisdictional question" as one of the most deceptive
of legal pitfalls, and has maintained that the insistence on such empty formal-
23. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
24. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
25. LZPPMAN, THE GOOD SOcIETY 353 (1937).
26. United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
27. Scripps-Howard Radio v. Federal Communications Commission, 316 U.S. 4
(1942).
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isms was but a reversion to seventeenth century pleading.28 He was instru-
mental in destroying the "mischievous formula" of Smyth v. Ames 219 as a
guide for utility regulation. In 1944 the Court declared that if the total effect
of a rate order made bv the Federal Power Commission 30 was not unjust and
unreasonable, judicial inquiry came to an end. Oddly enough, Justice Frank-
furter dissented on the ground that when Congress provided for judicial re-
view as it had in this case the "just and reasonable" concept was one over
which the Court was to have the last word, and was not to be left to the skill
of experts. The requirement that rates be "just and reasonable" was not an
issue of fact over which the Commission's own determination was to be con-
clusive. Social as well as economic costs had to be considered, and the Court
could not be guided by the mere impact of the rate order. Apparently "just
and reasonable" as considered by Frankfurter still meant that the Court
could examine every factor so as to determine its reasonableness. One won-
ders if this formula is any less mischievous than Smyth v. Ames.
There is no doubt that the growth of the administrative state calls for
adequate safeguards against arbitrary action and against violations of statu-
tory and constitutional guarantees. Surely this also includes having an adequate
record so that the Court may be able to determine the basis for the agency's
rulings. The difficulty is encountered when there is an insistence that every-
thing be spelled out in detail. Frankfurter refuses to accept the relationship of
a higher court to a lower court when dealing with an administrative body.
Justice Black felt impelled to state in the Chenery case 3' that "judicial re-
quirement of circumstantially detailed findings as the price of court approval
can bog the administrative power in a quagmire of minutiae." In another rather
interesting development, the majority held that a lower court could not.up-
hold the subpoena of an agency and then do nothing about procuring the evi-
dence for which the subpoena had been issue.32 Frankfurter maintained that
since an order directing obedience to a subpoena does not issue automatically
when applied for by an agency, it was to be assumed that the lower court
judge, in view of some previous acquaintance with the case, had adequate
reasons for his action. Without meaning to be facetious, it might be suggested
that the lower court should have spelled out these reasons. An agency has a
right to such a court order when it is complying with the law, and has a right
to appeal from a lower court which has arbitrarily denied such a request.
Professor Konefsky has done a remarkable job of pointing up the sig-
nificant parts of Frankfurter's opinions, and of presenting them in the context
28. City of Yonkers v. United States, 320 U.S. 685, 692 (1944).
29. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
30. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 624 (1944).
31. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
32. Penfield Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585, 603(1947).
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of both majority and minority utterances. In doing so he has unfolded an ex-
ceptionally lucid picture of constitutional development in the last decade with
one of the most learned jurists of all times as the leading character. The book
is stimulating and provocative and enables the reader to gain an understanding
of the relationship of the Supreme Court to our system of government.
EDWARD SOFEN ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES. By Chester
Rohrlich. Albany: Matthew Bender & Co., 1949. Pp. 533. $12.00.
THIs book will serve the purpose of supplying a need keenly felt by
lawyers and businessmen for a long time. Of course, it is impossible to treat
exhaustively in one volume the many aspects of legal and economic aspects
touched upon by the author. However, this brief treatise gives much insight
into many vital problems confronting the businessman about to launch an
enterprise or contemplating changes in the nature of his organization.
Far too many commercial prospectors launch businesses before adequate
knowledge is gained as to the relative merits of different types of entrepre-
neurial units or the devices provided or permitted by law in organizing their
business setup, corporate or otherwise. So often a policy of trial and error is
invoked with little regard for pitfalls that may lurk just around the corner.
Every attorney engaging in any volume of commercial practice can vouch for
the many legal difficulties which might have been avoided if a little more fore-
sight had been employed during the creation of the business unit.
This book is more than a legal textbook; it will serve the purpose of a
business guide or manual. Every business promoter contemplating the launch-
ing of a business project, as well as the attorney supplying him with legal
advice, can well afford to read carefully a major portion of this book before
he decides upon the type of unit he is to employ and the details of its setup.
The main portion of the book is divided into thirteen chapters. The author
first takes up preliminary matters to be considered in a survey of the pro-
jected enterprise, giving an analysis of possible legal restrictions to be met
and making suggestions as to meeting them. He points out problems to be
considered in protecting and making use of inventions, copyrights, trademarks.
trade names, etc. Chapter III deals with matters confronting the promoter as
to his rights and liabilities. In Chapter IV the merits of the various forms of
business units are contrasted and evaluated. In the following two chapters
he offers suggestions for choosing the "best" form of business organization,
place of domicile, etc., under varied sets of facts.
Chapter VII is concerned with the problems relating to corporate pro-
